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Introduction 
 
Keywords are powerful words.  They clear a way through the complex and opaque.  
They name the important and urgent.  They guide action.  Think of how 
‘Anthropocene’, the disputed term for a geological epoch inaugurated by human 
industry has fast established the idea that we stand at the edge of destruction because 
of the irretrievable damage done to the earth and its corrective systems by the heavy 
human footprint.  The term has become a ‘paradigm dressed as epoch’ (Baskin, 2015: 
9), in the way of‘ ‘globalisation’ a few years earlier announcing the transition from a 
territorially organized world to one structured around free markets, global flows, and 
transnational authority.  An aspiring new entrant suggesting a course through the 
brittle future is ‘smart cities’, intended to bridge two realities.  One is the growing 
world prominence of cities, as they come to house two-thirds of the world population, 
make world culture, creativity and political economy, generate the bulk of carbon 
emissions, and shape developments in the non-urban world through the supply and 
communication chains they control (Amin and Thrift, 2016; Brenner, 2014; Burdett 
and Rode, 2011; Taylor, 2013).  The other is growing urban vulnerability, manifest in 
the threat posed to life amassed in cities by global warming, uncontrolled 
technologies, capitalist profligacy, dangerous pathogens, and geopolitical instability; a 
vulnerability compounded by innate urban fragilities such as congestion, pollution 
and sprawl, infrastructural complexity and failure, and social stress and inequality 
(Amin, 2013).  
 
‘Smart cities’ is an aspiring keyword premised on the possibility of an urban 
intelligence able to manage urban complexity as well as anticipate hazard and 
uncertainty.  It proposes the closely monitored wired city: software-governed 
infrastructures and habitats sending large real time data to computational systems 
and models able to map the complex city and generate credible scenarios to city 
leaders, systems providers and research laboratories working closely with each other 
to continuously adjust the urban through the intelligence gathered (Department of 
Business, Innovation and Skills, 2013; Institute for the Future, 2012).  It offers a way 
of thinking global and urban turbulence as governable – the urban age managed for 
world prosperity, security and sustainability.  Like Anthropocene, the term is 
disputed, considered by its critics as a conceit of science and technology that will 
struggle to deliver its promise, unable to reign in the living city’s many information 
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anomalies and knowledge gaps, governance resistances and frictions, functional 
autonomies and unpredicted developments (Townsend, 2013).  It is also accused of 
underestimating the richness and necessity of social response and lay knowledge in 
addressing hazard, uncertainty and risk (Greenfield, 2013), and of generally 
stupefying the urban imagination (Sennett, 2012).  To this can be added that its 
precepts and propositions are hardly neutral or technical, but profoundly political.  
They glorify the cities that invest in smart technologies and smart governance, 
regardless of efficacy and slippage into surveillance.  They lean on hard-pressed cities 
to incur debts to fund expensive intelligence systems and expertise, fearful of losing 
out on future credit and investment. They hand over cities to a new technocracy 
masquerading as adjunct to government.  They tarnish cities ‘stuck’ with basic 
technologies, social intelligence, and rudimentary expertise as out of date and 
ineffective.   
 
Yet academic exposure of the flimsiness of the concept will not dent its circulation as 
a keyword.  After all, it recommends smartness not stupidity, and a clear course of 
action for cities to pursue.  It has all the sheen of utopian urban projects that have 
captivated publics and planners in the past.  It presents a simple slogan around which 
decision makers can rally, showing that they have found a way of tackling risk and 
delivering the promise of the urban age.  It apprehends the future as manageable, in 
the process glossing over genuine dangers and vulnerabilities, downgrading honed 
responses that do not fit with the mantra.  It allows attention to stray from the 
closeness of cities to danger and misfortune, from daily practices of mitigation, 
maintenance and repair, from other forms of anticipatory and preparatory knowledge 
in the city, from the improvised and experimental in keeping up with a constantly 
changing urban environment.  It glosses over urban realities that are central in 
shaping the ability of cities to negotiate ontological risk and uncertainty.   
 
This paper works with these realities by foregrounding the idea of urban failure, in 
the belief that collective dysfunction is what cities everywhere daily confront as 
complex open systems facing constantly evolving and uncertain circumstances.  This 
risk is experienced in different forms and intensities and is met with different degrees 
of success.  In order to acknowledge this variety and the lived practices of risk 
mitigation that defy easy categorization, the term is not deployed as an alternative 
keyword.  Instead, it is offered as a proposition: that cities are imperfect machines of 
coordination poised on the edge of failure, but able to stave off collapse because of 
accumulated, largely machine, intelligence.  This mitigation capacity, however, always 
involves omissions and sacrifices.  Smartness, from this perspective, is about systems 
integration and coordination, and in service of distributed protections and 
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capabilities, but without pretensions of total oversight and control, and not about 
preparedness based on perfect computational intelligence. 
 
Close to the Edge 
 
With so many types of city in the world existing in so many different states, it would 
take some courage to fit them into a singular symptom.  Yet there is no shortage of 
such thinking, making light of context and specificity.  Typically, on the negative side, 
cities are imagined as places of dissent, surveillance and militarisation in the world 
after 9/11, as sites of population concentration vulnerable to the vicissitudes of 
climate change, inadequate provisioning and social dislocation, or as spaces that are 
hard to govern because of their size and complexity.  On the positive side, cities are 
portrayed as the world’s nodes of creativity and learning, consumption and 
competiveness, supply and circulation, and power and authority.  They are seen as 
world making in every respect.  Though these summaries are rarely intended as 
descriptions of all cities or an entire city, they set out the measure of things – the 
cardinals of fear of aspiration, the kind of city that Lagos or London is, the 
interventions needed to improve urban prospects.  The city of symptoms displaces 
the city of situated practices, and with it, the need to understand how cities negotiate 
risk, adversity and opportunity in their own ways, and with different degrees of 
success.  The liveliness of urban process, the detail of the labour involved in urban 
maintenance, tends to get ignored.   
 
This is not to say that the narrative of symptoms has no general value.  The negative 
narrative, for example, lists enough dangers for most cities to be concerned.  The 
devastation caused by hurricanes such as Katrina in New Orleans and Sandy in New 
York is a warning that even the most prepared cities are not exempt from the kind of 
wreckage regularly heaped on less resilient cities in the South by the ‘storms’ of 
climate change.  Port au Prince and Dhaka are no longer exceptions.  So it is with the 
urban focus of terrorist attack, considering that the list which includes New York, 
Nairobi, Madrid, Bombay, London, Istanbul, Paris, and Brussels proves that cities of 
strategic or symbolic importance anywhere in the world are at risk - their defence 
systems unable to prevent the assaults, their populations and leaders left disarmed 
and fearful, their legacies of intelligence and preparedness torn asunder.  And the 
same can be said for the vulnerability of most cities to mutating pathogens testing 
even the most comprehensive monitoring and protection systems.  If the cities with 
the most advanced systems have managed to stave off large–scale loss until now, this 
may not be for long, as it gets easier for pathogens to spread globally, as the limits of 
emergency planning and health care are reached, and as the elaborate social and 
physical morphology of cities defies detection and prevention.   
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These threats are compounded by problems of infrastructural overload, another 
common urban symptom.  Cities depend on the effective circulation of capital, 
information, knowledge, commodities, and metabolic necessities, but trunk 
infrastructures supplying water, electricity, information, transport and the like are 
expensive to build and maintain.  Exponential urban growth has been accompanied in 
most cities of the world with insufficient investment, constraints posed by the built 
environment and property regimes, and regulatory failings including inadequate or 
poor public management.  The resulting infrastructural failures and congestions, 
sharpened inequalities of distribution, and rampant profiteering from lack have 
become commonplace, with acute consequences for poor urban majorities in the 
South already facing multiple deprivations such as unemployment, ill health, violence, 
insecurity, bad housing and lack of income and opportunity.  This coupling of large-
scale social deprivation and large-scale infrastructural malfunction is a warning to 
governments and elites everywhere.  The explosion of urban unrest in North Africa 
and the Middle East may be a foretaste of what is to come in cities plagued by the 
many forms of market, military, or authoritarian adventurism in the world today, but 
also those in the North confronting neoliberal austerity, as the popular uprisings in 
Athens and Madrid show.   
 
The negative narrative portrays a failing urban world and it judges the provisioning 
systems of cities to be inadequate, even accentuating the challenges of risk society.  It 
makes the positive narrative extoling cities as cradles of prosperity, creativity and 
civilization (Hollis, 2013; Glaeser, 2011; Kasarda, 2012) seem ingenuous, a detraction 
from the very real need for cities to prepare against hazard and uncertainty.  It 
resonates with the experiments of risk mitigation in cities with formal urban planning 
procedures, including attempts to wire up the city, improve anticipatory intelligence, 
sharpen surveillance and policing, improve infrastructures and services, control 
migration, reduce carbon emissions, build flood barriers, and raise public awareness 
and resilience.  Sometimes this variety and its definitional ambiguity plays to a 
politics of urban protection seeking not only to tackle real risks and hazards, but also 
reorient the city towards particular interests and dispositions in the name of risk 
mitigation, with decidedly unpleasant outcomes for subjects deemed to be suspicious, 
dangerous, or unable to protect themselves (Amin, 2012; Graham and McFarlane, 
2014; Owen, 2015).  The perception of cities at risk folds easily into a selective 
biopolitics of mitigation. 
 
Despite the shortcomings of symptomatic thinking, it is not unproductive to think of 
the urban present as precarious, and that cities are poised on the edge of failure.  But 
it is wise to stretch only this far, for urban failure is not than common and rarely total 
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because cities are not inert entities.  As Vale and Campanella (2005) have observed, 
very few cities have disappeared in the course of the millennial history of 
urbanization.  Most have learned to anticipate danger, limit damage, and recover from 
destruction.  This is not to diminish the devastation they have faced from war, disease 
or famine, infrastructural failure, blocked supplies or governance failure.  Nor is it to 
suggest that recovery has been free of costly losses and sacrifices, or that cities have 
emerged more resilient and in fairer ways.  And some historic cities have indeed 
failed to survive.  However, the kind of total collapse that Jared Diamond (2005) 
writes about when tightly-knit societies find their relatively homogenous wisdoms 
caught out by adverse circumstances, tends to be avoided by cities because of their 
constitutive plurality, including the heterogeneity of their knowledge practices.  This 
can be proposed at least as the principle behind failure averted, whose efficacy I wish 
to suggest, however, depends on the character of a city’s regime of risk anticipation 
and management, including the rules of expertise and government and the rituals of 
urban maintenance and repair.  It is this automaticity that validates or suppresses the 
plural wisdoms of risk anticipation and mitigation, the breadth and depth of urban 
failure.  
 
Saving the City  
 
This automaticity is barely acknowledged in the mounting literature on urban risk 
mitigation and disaster management, in which the emphasis falls squarely on the 
qualities of expertise, government or civic behaviour.  The capabilities of 
thinking/acting humans and their institutions are placed decidedly in the foreground, 
with scant attention paid to enabling or underlying urban infrastructures.  This is 
especially so in work focusing on civic preparedness, which observes a surge in social 
altruism during emergencies and disasters, in the form of donations, volunteering, 
and heightened mutual support among victims.  Confirming much of this in her 
review of major urban disasters in Europe and the Americas over the last century, 
Rebecca Solnit (2010) goes so far as to suggest that urban recovery should be led by 
citizens and civic associations, with government urban planners and experts 
following in tow, rather than the other way.  Her claim is that the social energy 
typically released during an emergency would not dissipate if communities felt 
empowered (in contrast to the usual practice of being undervalued or crushed by 
governments and elites), eventually offering cities a base of distributed intelligence 
and capability to address future hazard. 
 
The irony, however, is that many cities in the majority world - confronted by a mix of 
official mismanagement, failing infrastructures, limited resources or expertise, and 
self-serving elites - do rely on social energy to deal with daily and exceptional hazard, 
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but the consequences are not quite the same as those imagined by Solnit.  Social 
creativity and altruism are entangled with and constrained by the crushing weight of 
poverty and lack, the intense scramble for resource and opportunity, the pressures of 
self-survival in an unforgiving urban environment, and the suppression of civic 
organisation by authorities, elites and powerful social groups.  In these circumstances, 
it is the full spectrum of human affects that prevails, including anomie and animosity, 
not just care among strangers.  Solnit acknowledges the possibility of negative affects 
during an emergency, noting for example, the escalation of selfish and feral behavior 
during the Katrina crisis in New Orleans, but chooses to explain them as a backlash 
against excessive vilification or curtailment of the public by the authorities and the 
media, confident that they would evaporate in the city of distributed power and social 
recognition.  This confidence strikes me as speculative, an underestimation of the 
many constraints on social power in cities of mass inequality, poverty and 
rudimentary provisioning, of how extreme human vulnerability, institutional 
fallibility, and material precariousness disables communities as the primary source of 
urban repair and recovery.   
 
Where circumstances place the onus of survival on inhabitants, the ensuing social 
practices – atomistic or collaborative – are not necessarily an effective and 
sustainable buffer against adversity.  The literature on how people in informal 
settlements live with risk is revealing in this regard.  If the early studies of 
contemporary slums saw them as places of multiple deprivation and precariousness 
crushing the social agency of their inhabitants (Davis, 2007; UN-Habitat, 2008), 
recent writing has been more forgiving, finding more than the hapless victim in the 
slum dweller.  Some observers, echoing Solnit, discover resourceful people grasping 
opportunity against all the odds and sharing to make ends meet and secure better 
prospects (Saunders, 2010; Neuwirth, 2005).  The more detailed ethnographies, 
however, tend to find that human vulnerability and resilience are closely intertwined, 
such that the ability of slum dwellers to withstand adversity is constantly 
undermined by the sheer weight of existential challenges faced, from the lack of 
access to work, services and connectivity, to the oppressions of law, authority and 
clientelism.  A good example is Katherine Boo’s (2012) celebrated ethnography 
highlighting the daily swings between abjection and achievement in Annawadi 
located near Mumbai’s international airport (see also Wamsler and Brink, 2014, on 
why diverse social coping and adaptation strategies succeed or fail).   
 
In turn, work on material culture in informal settlements finds that technologies, 
habitats and infrastructures are implicated in the making of social subjectivity.  The 
experience of accessing water, electricity and sanitation, of living in makeshift 
housing and improvised public spaces, of relying on cobbled together technologies to 
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make ends meet, of negotiating particular atmospheres of place in order to get by, is 
shown to be involved in regulating the balance between anomie and altruism, 
initiative and apathy, hope and despair (Amin, 2014; Simone, 2014; McFarlane, 2013; 
Sundaram, 2010).  The studies reveal the materials of everyday life to be part of the 
sensory and affective field – the immersive environment on the inside of human 
thinking and feeling – and not just external object domains shaping social behaviour 
through their consumption.  This broader understanding of social being is echoed in 
another body of writing that traces the qualities of human capability in informal 
settlements to the politics of recognition: the legal and institutional recognition of 
residency and citizenship rights, the ability of the poor to organize, the strength of 
social movements, the power practices of authorities, adversaries and gatekeepers 
(Appadurai, 2002; Chatterjee, 2008; Holston, 2008; McCann, 2013; Satterthwaite and 
Mitlin, 2014).  It is the balance of instituted force, formal and informal, that is shown 
to shape the strength and character of the social agency of the poor.  In short, such 
research on materiality and micropolitics reveals that social capacity in the city is not 
reducible to innate or honed human inclinations, to the parables and practices of 
‘community’.   
 
To find that associational hybrids of various kinds are involved in shaping human 
vulnerability and resilience in the lived city is to also decentre accounts of risk 
mitigation emphasizing particular forms of urban expertise and government.  This 
includes the narrative of smart cities, with its faith in arrangements for extensive 
technological intelligence to capture real time developments, expertise in complex 
systems and non-linear modelling to anticipate the turbulent future, emergency 
planning based on close ties between science, expertise and government, risk 
awareness and vigilance in all quarters to prepare for the inevitable, and smart 
infrastructures able to regroup quickly from damage.  In this faith, the tradition of 
top-down urban planning is updated for circumstances held to be volatile and 
dangerous, by extending the intelligence base and by making strategic decision 
making faster and more collaborative.  There is no flaw in the principle that the threat 
of urban crisis or failure should be addressed by a closer relationship between 
science, expertise and government.  Who could find fault in this?  The question, 
however, is whether such planning will succeed, and if the assumption is that it can 
wield independent authority over the city then the answer has to be more 
circumspect.  This is because the city is no inert entity managed from the outside, but 
a lively sociotechnical system full of its own intelligences and arrangements that not 
only alter the actions of collaborating scientists, experts and managers, but also enroll 
these actors in ways that stray from paper intentions.   
 
Machine Culture 
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Cities are distributive systems - vast intersecting networks of infrastructure with 
their own organizational logics and their own powers of allocation and influence.  
These networks, including supply chains and transport and communications grids, 
financial, welfare and metabolic systems, and the array of materials and technologies 
that make up the built environment, make up the city.  Their zygotic knot is the urban 
ontology, it could be said, and their combined agency the machinic force that keeps 
the city on the move.  Nothing much in the city and beyond can happen without these 
networks, and not a lot can exist outside of the infrastructural constellation.  It 
instantiates city life, shapes the condition and distribution of wellbeing, and defines 
urban culture through its inhabitation.   
 
The automaticity of urban sociotechnical systems, however broken or robust, makes 
urban life in all its senses (Batty, 2013). This is all too evident when infrastructures 
fail, though often not explained in terms of the explained in terms of this automaticity 
(Graham, 2010).  Fukushima, the hurricanes battering Haiti and west coast US cities, 
the wars tearing apart cities in North Africa and the Middle East, the regular 
blackouts, floods and building collapses that plague cities of the South, the urban 
congestion and transport gridlocks facing cities everywhere, the terrorist attacks on 
world cities are timely reminders of the devastation caused and sustained by 
infrastructural incapacitation.  As infrastructures get painstakingly restored – or not – 
the dependency of so many and so much on the regularity of everyday urban 
provisioning is thrown sharply into relief.  The time of paralysis and recovery shows 
how much urban failure and urban repair are tied to the state of a city’s 
sociotechnical systems, to the silent whirr in the background of the machinery of 
urban maintenance, the labour of a bewildering array of entities-in-relation – 
manuals, programmes, codes, people, institutions, conventions, corporations, 
intelligent machines, software, data and materials – that make for awareness, 
circulation, provisioning and industry. 
 
Knowing the detail of the sociotechnical systems matters - their character as vast, 
accreted engineering complexes of varying robustness and resilience, as interest-
laden distributional networks, and as culturally formative (Graham and McFarlane, 
2014; Simone, 2015).  We are beginning to understand these wider connotations 
from the so-called infrastructural turn in urban studies.  Its studies of water, 
transport or electricity in Mumbai, Lagos or Rio de Janeiro reveal the urban fortunes 
at stake, the sharp inequalities of supply, the improvisations forced upon the poor by 
lack, the war waged between residents, elites and corporations over scarce resources, 
the chains of life poised on the fragility of tired and overstretched infrastructures 
(McFarlane, 2013; Farouk and Owusu, 2012; Björkman, 2015; McCann, 2014). Its 
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studies of smart technologies to closely monitor the urban environment, show 
surveillance and policing to be close in train, and when plagued by technical and 
coordination failures, still exercising considerable symbolic weight over city leaders 
and planners (Townsend, 2013; Greenfield, 2013; Halpern, et. al., 2103).  Its studies 
focusing on the cultural resonances of infrastructure, reveal the captivating force of 
big engineering and architectural projects even when they don't deliver to 
expectation (Harvey and Knox,   ), the ways in which city dwellers think, act and feel 
through everyday technologies that are getting increasingly smarter and intrinsic to 
the human experience in cities (Thrift,   ), and how the semiotics of the urban 
landscape, from signage to smells and soundscapes, work on public feelings and 
dispositions (Anderson, 2011; Hirschkind, 2011; Henshaw, 2014).  
 
These infrastructural reaches are not coincidental in defining urban vulnerability and 
resilience (Owen, 2015; Denis and Pontille, 2014; Ash, 2013).  There is, most 
obviously, the technical robustness of a city’s sociotechnical systems, which in turn is 
tuned to protect some urban spaces and subjects more than others.  City engineers 
and architects know this only too well, as do militaries and dissidents intent on 
incapacitating a city by disabling its transport, communications and energy systems.  
The technologies and routines of maintenance, repair and renewal, materials 
fabrication, system integration and circuit isolation, demand management and spare 
capacity, and foresight and planning, are crucial determinants of the capacity of a city 
to withstand adversity.  They are the material on which cultures of risk perception 
and management are tagged, and most importantly, they are the machinery through 
which decisions are enacted, consequences amplified, and returns prolonged.  If in 
market-driven Russia poor townsfolk unable to afford heating manage to secure some 
heating during the harsh winter, it is because the Soviet technology of energy 
distribution from municipal generating plants makes household-based isolation 
difficult, and keeps alive a legacy of universal provisioning creatively managed by 
municipal officials to heat homes scheduled to be cut off (Collier, 2011).   
 
I am not suggesting that culture is slave to technology or that the relationship 
between the two is a straightforward one, but the interdependencies are clear.  For 
example, in the early 20th century, Manchester moved quickly to tackle the hazards 
posed by untreated sewage pouring into its clogged waterways by embracing the new 
science of bacteriology to treat wastewater because of the authority of scientific 
experts in policy formation, while in Chicago, facing the same problems, powerful 
self-serving politicians managed to block the treatment for nearly three decades, 
doggedly questioning the scientific case (Platt, 2004).  There were all kinds of 
mediations at work, but the links of technology and culture were unmistakable.  As 
the bacterial treatment of wastewater spread worldwide and the technology became 
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the standard of urban sanitation, so too grew its status as symbol of responsible 
urban stewardship, allowing easy judgment of different sanitation systems as both 
hazardous and morally wrong.  Urban ‘technological frames’ (Bijker, 1995) are 
governance regimes that incorporate world-views, professional conventions, ways of 
thinking, and policy practice associated with particular scientific and technological 
arrangements.  They are part of the machine culture of urban preparedness, the 
encrustations of technology and culture resistant to radical change, yet endowed with 
the ‘dynamic inertia’ of tried and tested adjustments to long histories of exposure to 
hazard and risk (Hommels, 2005).  They are both honed and fragile resilience 
machines, keeping cities from daily failure but also capable of causing large-scale 
damage when exposed.   
 
Either way, this machine culture is the passage point and test of diverse proposals to 
prevent urban failure, including recommendations of vigilant communities, smart 
technologies and expert government.  It is the worked material of urban 
preparedness that both precedes and exceeds the proposals, expecting analysis of 
urban vulnerability to consider the technicalities, political economy and cultural 
power of system automaticity, for its robustness is key to how far and fast hazards 
translate into urban failure and how quick and extensive recovery can be.  This means 
getting to know the provisioning dynamic and robustness of a city’s assemblage of 
transport and communication, water, energy and sanitation, housing and the built 
environment, security and emergency management, and information and knowledge.  
It means parsing proposals through this assemblage, by making them  ‘charismatic’ so 
as to create ‘social drama’ behind them (as Kim, 2013 shows for the steps behind the 
success of pioneering flying machines), by attending to coalitions and alliances that 
ensure their translation and transmission, by making them seem like knowledge from 
the street and established forms of expertise (Dierig, Lachmund and Mendelsohn, 
2003).  The effort to build urban resilience requires constructing a field of influence 
that is of the field itself.   
 
But even this is no guarantee of success, for the techno-cultures talk back, spitting out 
innovations or incorporating them in ways that alter intentions.  The history of urban 
reinforcement is riddled with failed innovations and unintended consequences, not 
only because of insufficient attention to translation and transmission, as Bruno 
Latour (1993) has shown for Aramis, the experimental rapid transit project of the late 
1960s intended to convey cars like trains across Paris.  It is also because of the 
liveliness of embedded infrastructures, for example, ‘smart city’ interventions coming 
unstuck because of host systems becoming overloaded with information from sensors 
placed everywhere, presenting a hinterland of crusty infrastructures behind the 
smart monitoring technologies, falling prey to surveillance agendas before risk 
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modeling ones (Halpern et. al., 2013).  The material of past preparedness intervenes.  
So does the material of new interventions in unexpected ways.  The extensive 
concretization of Hong Kong after the 1960s to stop the frequent landscapes caused 
by its decomposing granite base, as advised by then cutting-edge geoscience, set in 
train a motion of property speculation serving the city’s elites, pushing out the poor 
to the vulnerable geo-margins, and killing off the soil on which the future of the entire 
city hangs (Bobbette, 2015).  Short-term resilience can turn into long-term 
vulnerability when the foresight is lacking or when the interventions are expedient in 
narrow ways. 
 
Failure Short of a Keyword 
 
To think of cities in terms of failure is to recognize their vulnerability to today’s many 
global hazards and risks, and to acknowledge that they are hard to manage as 
complex open systems.  Given the comprehensive urbanization of human settlement, 
and with cities shaping so much of what goes on in the world, the potential and cost 
of urban failure is set to be high.  Yet, the history of cities is one of continuity, 
recovery and regeneration, albeit with not inconsiderable losses, conflicts and 
divisions.  My argument has been that this capacity to keep back from the edge of the 
abyss has everything to do with the agency of the socio-technical systems that are the 
city.  They enable large-scale distribution, regulation and maintenance, regardless of 
their state of repair, and they do this more or less effectively.  They are constantly 
reworked, through a combination of improvisation and innovation, patchwork repair 
and overhaul, and planning and auto-adjustment.  It is through them that intentional 
and vernacular knowledge must pass for validation and amplification.  Practices of 
intelligence, security and distribution embedded in the city’s machine culture 
regulate the preparedness of a city to hazard and risk.  
 
Viewed in this way, the term urban failure lacks the convening force of a keyword in 
the sense alluded at the start of the paper, for it signals no general truth or 
momentum.  It does not lend itself as a master category like globalization or 
Anthropocene, or for that matter, other similar categories of ‘failure’, such as ‘market 
failure’ or ‘state failure’.  If such references to failure are laden with directional 
muscle, including ideological condemnations of practices that do not fit with 
hegemonic fictions of requisite organization (in this case market freedoms and states 
in tow following particular scripts of behaviour), the heuristic of ‘urban failure’ in this 
essay alludes to a possibility both exacerbated and tempered by the ontology of the 
city as an assemblage of assemblages.  The term is indicative, but serious, privileging 
neither certainty (of urban failure or mitigation) nor a preferred mode of urban 
organization and government.  Indeed, quite the opposite, by cautioning against a 
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rosy vision of cities and their world–saving qualities, against ideologies of risk, 
smartness and resilience premised on particular applications of science, technology 
and government, and against any presumption of only human ordainment of urban 
affairs.  Its intention is to wrest the discussion of urban failure away from the 
dominance of such thinking, with its denials of urban fragility, or its confidence in 
managerial interventions and superior forms of intelligence, or its keywords such as 
‘smartness’ or ‘community’ or ‘vigilance’ that automatically cast urban states and 
responses that do not fit as ‘stupid’ or ‘backward’.  In discussion on urban failure too 
there are master categories imposing a standard that the more pragmatic term here 
seeks to puncture and displace in order to reveal another urban condition. 
 
This is a condition of adversities whose severity and duration depends on and is 
tempered by the machine culture of cities.  The heuristic that encapsulates it does not 
forecast imminent and inevitable urban collapse at a turbulent time as if the fabric of 
the city were inert, but instead foregrounds the immanent and conditional in the form 
of the hidden liveliness of urban infrastructures – tagging the nature and scale of 
failure or recovery to the technical, aesthetic, political and cultural qualities of the 
infrastructures.  This inclination to tread the contingent is not to suggest that honed 
techno-cultures of preparedness are up to the task, for they can defect in so many 
ways, by failing, becoming outmoded, serving particular interests, falling into 
disrepair, getting overloaded, developing lives beyond provisioning and risk 
mitigation.  If the machine culture of cities tempers failure, it does so imperfectly, as is 
so evident from the acute and persistent problems of urban vulnerability across the 
world.  Nor is it innocent, as we know from writing on the history of urban 
infrastructures as a history of population management - the inventions of mapping, 
lighting, sanitation, surveillance, and architectural design shown to govern for 
distinctive, and usually uneven, biopolitical ends far exceeding the immediacies of 
keeping the city of the move, defending it from adversity (Joyce, 2013; Collier and 
Lakoff, 2015; Amoore, 2013; Graham and McFarlane, 2014; Lancione, 2015).  
 
The perspective on urban failure I have offered presents a policy paradox, caught 
between action of a certain kind and limits posed by machine culture.  On the side of 
the possible, a fashion for smart technologies, smart people or smart government is 
deemed inadequate, however joined up and however well managed, because they 
ignore the vast urban hinterland that forms the ground of urban preparedness.  I have 
used different terms to describe this hinterland – lively infrastructures, machine 
cultures, socio-technical systems – to get at the vitality, intelligence and salience of 
mundane networks of transport, water, electricity, shelter, care, security, and so on, in 
dealing with urban vulnerability, successfully or otherwise.  Accordingly, it may be 
that building the resilient city is about planning for capacious, responsive, equitable 
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and reparable infrastructures, a task requiring diverse actors - engineers, architects, 
sociologists, planners and publics – to collaborate as equals to ensure material 
robustness, systems compatibility, constancy of supply, and distributional fairness.  
This requires a politics of the urban common ground in order to better manage the 
dispersal, flow and coming together that is the city, and in order to ensure readiness 
for the adverse or unexpected, for example, by building excess into supply chains.  It 
also requires a politics of distributional fairness so that the ubiquity of the city is 
matched by a similar ubiquity of social and spatial preparedness.  Isn’t this what 
social democratic urban planning once intended, even if not couched in the language 
of risk mitigation?  Isn’t this what laissez-faire has so dangerously compromised by 
privileging the immediately profitable and exhaustible?  Isn’t this what folk 
understanding of urban failure is about, contra the designs of experts and managers, 
based on the very real experience of infrastructural exclusion and associated 
frustrations of housing, water, energy, health, education, insurance, connectivity, and 
mobility? 
 
Focusing on machine culture, though, requires being clear about the limits of policy 
action.  The hinterland is a world of hidden interacting intelligent systems with their 
own evolutionary dynamics (Thrift, 2014).  The systems are largely opaque, their 
logic and yield is relational and non-linear, and they are almost self-governing as 
assemblages of human and technological intelligence.  Making them visible in the way 
Kevin Lynch (1960) wanted in the 1950s by proposing transparent buildings and 
infrastructures so that they could be redesigned, or in the way smart city enthusiasts 
aspire from the ‘big data’ of ubiquitous computing, only registers their presence.  It 
does not make them straightforwardly manageable.  There is only so much urban 
policy can do or direct, because in the mangle of the machine culture, interventions 
get modified, rejected, attached to unintended targets.  There is no inert ground that 
policies can pretend to rework at will towards planned goals, only an active material 
field that pushes back.   
 
Accordingly, a politics of ground preparedness has to be modest and immanent in its 
expectations, focusing on system design rather than operational detail, aligning a 
myriad of actants, making for repair and maintenance, adjusting to changing 
circumstances, accepting that policy failures and departures are inevitable, an 
opportunity to reassess and learn.  This is a politics of improvisation and adjustment 
in the dark, of cultivating the field in ways that others can act, of underwriting 
machine responsiveness.  The smartness here has to do with acknowledging the 
intelligence of what has gone and goes by in the urban fabric, placing policy at its 
service (Gandy, 2014).  This intelligence and its systems always remain elusive, 
excess to projects to ‘reveal’ them, powered forward by their own durations.   The 
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experimented histories of the urban machinic unconscious (for this is what city 
systems are) question the presumption that today’s cities face exceptional risk 
circumstances, and point to an urban technostructure that has always existed to 
mediate the balance between vulnerability and resilience in the city.  We are 
challenged to understand how these durations are formed, and how they might 
become allies in tempering the furies of the Anthropocene.  We are reminded that this 
machine does not need a technological fix, but care-full and constant curatorship of 
its socio-material relationships.  These allusions may lack the surely and luster of 
master narratives of urban failure, but heeding them might prove to be more effective 
in keeping cities on this side of the brink. 
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